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BACKGROUND: TOWARDS A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF CANADIAN-NIGERIAN 
BILATERAL RELATIONS  
 
OLABISI D. AKINKUGBE* 
 
Abstract 
Although the diplomatic relations between Canada and Nigeria is almost six decades old, the 
nature of this bilateral relationship has not been the subject of rigorous academic research. While 
a recent body of research by international relations scholars has taken up the broad critical study 
of Canadian-African relations, a significant gap exists with respect to studies that focus on the 
context of Canada’s engagement with individual African countries. Against this background, this 
paper briefly examines the bilateral trade and investment engagements between Nigeria and 
Canada. The modest aim is to highlight the existing framework that guides the relations of both 
countries, highlight some projects, and document some preliminary observations while posing 
further questions that will deepen our understanding of the socio-legal implications of Canadian-
Nigerian bilateral engagements. 
 
 
1.UNTIL the independence of most African states in the 1960s from European colonial rule,1 
Canada had no direct engagement with these states.2 Since then, however, Canadian relations in 
Africa have expanded broadly across the continent. 3  Yet, despite the expansion of these 
engagements, the nature of Canada’s relationship with Africa remains ambivalent.4 This article 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, Canada. Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty 
of Law, University of Ottawa; LLM (University of Toronto), LLB (Hons) (University of Lagos, Nigeria), BL (Hons) 
(Nigerian Law School, Abuja); email: olabisi.akinkugbe@gmail.com. Earlier version of this paper was presented as 
“Canada in Africa: An Overview of some Canadian Projects in West Africa” at an Interdisciplinary international 
conference entitled: “Canadian Anglophone Human Rights Engagements: A Critical Assessment of the Literature 
and a Research Agenda”, December 8-10, 2016, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. The author 
acknowledges the gracious support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
1 For an account that takes stock of Canada’s renewed aid policies and programs towards Africa in the context of 
renewal and reform, see David R Black, “Canadian Aid to Africa: Assessing ‘Reform’” in Andrew F Cooper & 
Dane Rowlands, eds, Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities (Montreal: McGill-Queens University 
Press, 2006) 319; Stephen Brown, “The instrumentalization of foreign aid under the Harper government” (2016) 
97:1 Stud in Pol Econ, 18 at 19. 
2 South Africa was an exception in this regard as a small amount of trade existed between both countries. “Since 
1957, Canada, either directly or indirectly through dual and multiple accreditation has extended diplomatic relations 
to the whole of Anglophone Africa as well as to Ethiopia, Somali and Liberia.” Robert O Matthews, “Canada and 
Anglophone Africa” in Peyton V Lyon and Tareq Y Ismael, eds, Canada and the Third World (1976, Macmillan of 
Canada, Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976) 60 at 61, 90 [Matthews, “Canada and Anglophone Africa”]. 
3 For a historical account of Canadian and Anglophone African countries, see Matthews, ibid. 
4 See generally, Yves Engler, Canada in Africa: 300 years of aid and exploitation (Fernwood Publishing, 2015); 
David R Black, Canada & Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency, (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015). For an interesting historical account of the emergence of Canadian aid and 
its politics in Francophone and Anglophone Africa, see Robert O Matthews, “Canada’s Relations with Africa” 
(1975) 30:3 Intl J 536 at 549-560 [Matthews, “Canada’s Relations with Africa”]. 
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explores and provides some background analysis towards a critical assessment of the bilateral 
(i.e. trade and investment) engagements between Canada and Nigeria. The article is part of a 
broader research agenda aimed at developing a scholarly documentation of the relations between 
Canada and Anglophone Africa.5 Its modest objective is to look critically at the implications that 
emerge from these bilateral engagements with a view to likely raising questions for further 
(empirical) research that will deepen our scholarly understanding. Readers should keep in mind 
that this article serves primarily as background work for a project that will be further developed 
in the near future. 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This section reviews some critical literature from international relations scholars that have 
examined on the broad level the engagements between Canada and Africa. This heterogeneous 
theoretical perspective provides the basis for analyzing the implications of the relationship 
between Canada and individual African countries. Those who utilize this approach (such as 
David R. Black and Edward Akuffo) are interested in teasing out and explicating the embedded 
power and other relations in these engagements as a means of fostering a better understanding 
for challenging their current constitution. Together these scholarly interventions will inform 
                                                 
5 See Canadian-Anglophone Human Rights Engagements, online: <54.218.11.54/caahre/>. See also Canada’s 
Rights Role in Anglophone Africa, online: <www.carriaa.org/about/>. 
CARRIAA builds on the success of an existing Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SSHRC) funded research into Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements led by Professor 
Obiora Okafor. The research maps, analyzes and theorizes the nature, attainments, problems and prospects 
of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements between 1999 (when Nigeria’s current democratic regime 
was established) and 2011 (a convenient cut-off date). The research study was borne out of a need to 
address the inadequacy and dearth in existing scholarly literature on the nature, attainments, problems, and 
prospects of Canadian-Nigerian human rights cooperation despite a long history of general bilateral 
relations and cooperation in human rights between both countries. One of the goals of the research study is 
to inform policy and practice in human rights engagement between Canada and Nigeria and also other 
similar country-to-country relationships. 
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some of the critical analysis that this article undertakes in respect of the specific Canadian-
Nigerian case. 
In his work, David R. Black offers an interesting theoretical analysis of Canada’s “high-
profile engagement” in Africa.6 According to Black, “Analytical Eclecticism” provides a useful 
theoretical tool for a rigorous study of the engagements between Canada and African countries. 
It offers a “more complete and compelling interpretation of certain social problems” while also 
providing the space “to make sense of the persistent patterns and apparent contradictions of a 
Canadian encounter with Africa that has sometimes enjoyed remarkably high levels of 
prominence and popularity, but has just as regularly faded into obscurity, with deleterious effects 
for policy effectiveness.” 7  According to him ‘analytical eclecticism’ combines competing 
research traditions with a view to “defining and exploring substantive problems in original, 
creative ways [that contribute] to both a deeper understanding of a critical problem and 
theoretical progress for international relations.”8 In his work, Black combines three frameworks 
of analysis: the international society/good international citizenship approach, the Coxian or neo-
Gramscian/hegemonic middle-powermanship approach, and a post-colonial approach. Through 
this theoretical lens, he expounds “the inconsistencies and contradictions [that underpin] 
Canada’s involvement in Africa”9 in three core areas that define Canada’s engagements in the 
Africa. First, “through erratic aid policies that benefit Canadians and reinforce inequities”10; 
second, through failed security policies that do not reflect the “normative advocacy of high 
                                                 
6 Black, supra note 4 at 15-16. 
7 Black, ibid at 17. See also Black, ibid at 34-35 (i.e. Table 1.1, titled “Three Theoretical Frames for Canada in 
Africa”). 
8 See Black, ibid at 16. See also Peter Katzenstein & Rudra Sil, “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of 
International Relations” in Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 109; Rudra Sil, “Simplifying Pragmatism: From Social 
Theory to Problem-driven Eclecticism” (2009) 11:3 Intl Stud Rev 648. 
9 See Black, supra note 4 at 2. 
10 Ibid. 
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minded principles with sufficient resources to realistically support them”11; and third, through 
“large extractive industry investments that undermine local environments and human security.”12  
In other words, according to Black, most of Canada’s promises towards the African continent – 
whether in the context of aid packages, resource extraction and economic growth, or human 
rights and security – have achieved significantly less than was expected. The critical approach 
amplifies the hypocrisy of Canadian bilateral trade relations in Africa as one that is too 
embedded with national interests and has systemically perpetrated narrow self-seeking objectives 
that are fueled by the empty rhetoric of official statements.13  
 A non-imperial internationalist approach that draws on the theoretical insights of the 
constructivists informs Edward Ansah Akuffo’s book on Canadian foreign policy in Africa.14 
This ‘non-imperial internationalist’ approach emphasizes the “degree to which Canada’s ‘moral 
identity’15 in Africa is co-constituted through the engagements between Canadian and African 
policies and officials.”16 According to the approach, foreign policy is not static. Rather, the ideas 
that “hold it together are produced by societal actors, states and international institutional 
practice over time and space and therefore are subject to change.”17 Canada engages global, 
regional, and local actors in its relations in Africa. Even though African regional institutions 
have been important mediums of this engagement, they have received less attention. Akuffo’s 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Matthews, “Canada’s Relations with Africa”, supra note 4 at 537.  
14 See Edward Ansah Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security, and 
Development, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishers, 2012). Akuffo offers a “critical examination of Canada’s policy 
towards peace, security and development in Africa. Specifically, it examines Canada’s response to the post-Cold 
War security-development challenges in relation to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Security Mechanism.” Ibid at 1. 
15 According to Akuffo, “Canada’s moral identity entails how Canada perceives itself as caring, a good international 
citizen, and as a humanitarian and moral actor. The other side of the coin is the construction of Africa as the ‘other’ 
which is conflict-ridden and poor and, hence, requiring the benevolent support of Canada especially through 
development assistance and peacekeeping.” Ibid at 2.  
16 Black, supra note 4 at 9. 
17 Akuffo, supra note 14 at 203. 
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work fills this gap by examining “how Canada’s moral identity in Africa has been constructed 
especially through development assistance and in its relationship with African regional 
organizations [such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States] 
and how this identity in turn influences the pursuit of Canada’s interests …” in Africa.18 In the 
context of its indirect involvement, Canada has been actively involved in the promotion and 
entrenchment of neoliberal polices and ideologies through regional economic initiatives in 
Africa. An instance of this relates to Canada’s promotion of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD).19 According to Akuffo, “Canada’s support for the NEPAD was driven 
by economic interest and the opportunity that NEPAD offered to ‘institutionalize’ the neoliberal 
ideology in African economies.” 20  Similarly, the Canadian government’s engagement with 
African regional institutions, such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), has been aimed towards institutionalizing the legal and structural mechanisms that 
would enhance the continents security deficit.21 In its relationship with ECOWAS, the promotion 
of peace, human security, and stability have received significant attention from the Canadian 
government.22  
 Black and Akuffo broadly speak to Canada’s engagement in Africa from different 
theoretical lens that enrich the narrative. Yet, the socio-legal implications of Canada’s 
engagement with individual countries in Africa remains under-studied. An important aspect of 
this analysis is the role of transnational corporations as actors in trade and investment relations. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 For more information, see NEPAD, online: <www.nepad.org/content/about-nepad#aboutourwork>. For a critical 
examination of NEPAD, see James Thuo Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agreement in the Light of 
Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development” (2003) 13:1 Transnat’l L & 
Contemp Probs 179. 
20 Akuffo, supra note 14 at 97. 
21 See Akuffo, ibid at Chapter 6. The chapter is titled “Theorizing Canadian Policy towards the AU and ECOWAS”. 
22 Ibid at Chapter 5. The chapter is titled “Canada and Human Security in West Africa”.  
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In focusing on the trade and investment relations between both countries in the ensuing sections, 
this article examines the context of Canadian-Nigerian bilateral engagements. 
  
III. CANADIAN-NIGERIAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS 
Canada and Nigeria’s direct diplomatic relations date back to the early years after Nigeria’s 
independence in 1960 from British colonial rule.23 Despite this long history, the engagement 
between both countries has been marked by various inconsistencies, as observed by Black (albeit 
in the context of Canadian-African relations). Understandably, the engagement has, over time, 
morphed and been reshaped through the years in response to changing political and economic 
conditions in both countries. Despite the inconsistency,24 some themes nonetheless guide the 
engagement between Canada and African countries. These themes include: the promotion of 
democratic values and good governance (particularly with respect to the conduct of elections); 
trade and investment (which has been marked by the conclusion of different bilateral trade 
agreements); mineral development in the extractive industries (an area where Canadian mining 
companies have been very active in Africa); climate change; post-conflict resolution and 
development; regional institutional and capacity building; and strengthening food security across 
the continent. 25  Canadian transnational corporations have, to date, been less active in the 
Nigerian extractive industries.26  
                                                 
23 For an exhaustive list of sectors that Canada is directly involved in in Nigeria, see Government of Canada, High 
Commission of Canada in Nigeria, Canada-Nigeria Relations, online: 
<www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=eng> 
[Government of Canada, Canada-Nigeria Relations]. 
24 See Black, supra note 4; David Hornsby, “Turning Perception into Reality: Canada in Africa” OpenCanada.org 
(7 November 2013), online: <www.opencanada.org/features/turning-perception-into-reality-canada-in-africa/>. 
25  See Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa, online: 
<www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afrique-ss/index.aspx?lang=eng>. 
26 Despite its limited involvement, Canada has influenced the design of the Nigerian mining-industry through its 
regulatory frameworks. See Patrick Ugeh, “Canada seeks to Invest in Nigeria’s Mining Sector” This Day Live (8 
November). See also Engler, supra note 4 at 166-167.  
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The focus in this section is on the Canadian-Nigerian bilateral trade and investment 
regime.  In recent times, Canada’s trade and investment engagement with Nigeria has witnessed 
a surge27 of participation by Canadian firms and transnational corporations in specific sectors, 
such as energy, transportation, and general physical infrastructure.28 Coupled with the surge, 
neoliberal economic and trade liberalization agendas have been aggressively pursued across the 
continent.29 According to Akuffo, “[t]o a large extent multilateral aid to Africa…became an 
instrument for free trade and liberalization that would in turn advance Canada’s economic 
interest in Africa.”30 Before examining industry-specific engagements, I analyze two agreements 
that provide the legal and institutional framework for Canadian-Nigerian trade and investment 
relations.  
 
A. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE NIGERIAN-CANADIAN 
BI-NATIONAL COMMISSION 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade of Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria on the Establishment of the Bi-National Commission (the “Commission”) was signed on 
April 23rd, 2012. The Commission aims to sustain high-level bi-lateral engagements between 
Canada and Nigeria with a view to promoting and increasing diplomatic cooperation, including 
                                                 
27 “In 2015, Nigeria was Canada’s second largest bilateral merchandise trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa with 
bilateral merchandise trade totaling $1.45 billion. Canada’s main imports consist of mineral fuels and oils, cocoa, 
rubber, lead and processed foods.” See Government of Canada, Canada-Nigeria Relations, supra note 23. 
28 Matthews, “Canada and Anglophone Africa”, supra note 2 at 98.  
29 According to Yves Engler, ‘Ottawa invested heavily in African neoliberalism with the Canada Fund for Africa 
providing some $30million to promote “trade” agreements and neoliberal reforms. Another $8 million was put into 
the Program for Building African Capacity for Trade while $7 million went into the join Integrated Technical 
Assistance Program for help with implementation of WTO agreements, policy formation and market development.” 
Engler, supra note 4 at 135. 
30 Akuffo, supra note 15 at 99. 
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economic and security issues.31 In particular, the Commission focuses on four (4) thematic areas: 
political relations; economic relations; security cooperation; and development cooperation.32 The 
political relations extend to broad sub-themes that anticipate promotion of human rights, good 
governance and democracy, anti-corruption, and migration challenges. Annex A of the 2012 
Proposed Bi-National Commission Work-plan anticipates the provision of support to Nigeria’s 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the extension of support to enhance 
democratic development in West Africa through the sharing of best practices. Similarly, the 
political relations plan foreshadows the facilitation of institutional linkages between bodies that 
are responsible for the promotion of human rights and good governance in national and regional 
contexts.  
 The expansive approach is also reflected in the enhanced economic relations that are 
anticipated as a result of the establishment of the commission. Nigeria and Canada are to explore 
opportunities and reduction of barriers to increase economic and commercial relations and 
investments in sectors of mutual interest such as the following: energy, infrastructure, 
transportation, information communication technologies, agriculture, hydropower, and mining.33 
Furthermore, the two States are to cooperate to address youth unemployment through improved 
education and vocational training strategies and institutional partnerships. In addition, both 
                                                 
31 See Government of Canada, High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Of Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Establishment of the Bi-National Commission art 1, online: 
<www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/highlights-
faits/2013/BiNationalCommissionNationaleMixte.aspx?lang=en> [Government of Canada, Memorandum of 
Understanding]. 
32 See ibid, art 4(1)-(4).  
33  See Government of Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, Reviewing CIDA’s Bilateral 
Engagement – Countries of Focus and Modest Presence Partners: Qualitative Assessment at 29, online: “Nigeria” 
<static.squarespace.com/static/51e5b274e4b0dbb11fbe2f63/t/52dbebd3e4b02995f7e16018/1390144467014/CIDA%
20atip%20countries%20of%20focus%20-%20scanned.pdf>. 
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States anticipate the subsequent conclusion of economic partnership agreements such as the 
Foreign Investment Protection Agreement.34  
 The Security Cooperation component of the Memorandum focuses on building capacity 
to respond to domestic and regional challenges, such as terrorism and the advancement of mutual 
security interests. Through Development Cooperation, both countries plan to explore strategies 
for the implementation of programs, such as the now expired Millennium Development Goals 
(replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals35) and the United Nations Commission on 
Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health. The participants in this 
Memorandum of Understanding may amend it based on mutual consent in writing or may 
terminate it by giving six-month notice in writing through diplomatic avenues.36 
B. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA 
AND NIGERIA  
In Canada, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are called Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreements (FIPAs). FIPAs set out the respective rights and obligations of the 
Contracting Countries with respect to the treatment of foreign investment. Since 2008, Canada 
has concluded several FIPAs with a number of African countries. The former conservative Prime 
Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, announced the conclusion of the Canadian-Nigerian 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement on May 1st, 2013. The agreement is 
expected to ensure a stable and secure bi-lateral trade and investment environment between 
Canada and Nigeria. FIPAs are designed to provide strong levels of protection to foreign 
                                                 
34 See Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, online: <international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nigeria/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng> [Government of Canada, 
Agreement Between Canada and Nigeria]. 
35  See UNDP, Sustainable Development Goals, online: 
<www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/>.  
36 See Government of Canada, Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 31 art 8(2)-(3). 
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investors – for both individuals and corporations – from arbitrary treatment by host states in 
which they own assets. According to a press release from the office of the then-Canadian Prime 
Minister, the treaty is:  
…designed to protect and promote Canadian investment abroad through legally binding 
provisions and to promote foreign investment in Canada. By ensuring greater protection 
against discriminatory and arbitrary practices, and enhancing predictability of a market’s 
policy framework, a FIPA allows investors to invest with greater confidence. Canada has 
consistently supported strong, rules-based investment through the negotiation of FIPAs.37  
It is anticipated that the FIPA will facilitate investment flow and contribute to job creation and 
economic growth in Nigeria and Canada.38 An “investment” means an enterprise, share, stock, or 
other form of equity participation or other interest in an enterprise, that entitles the owner to 
share in the income or profits of the enterprise, or the assets of that enterprise on dissolution. It 
also includes certain loans or advances made to an enterprise – including a bond, debenture, or 
other instrument – a commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Contracting 
Country to economic activity in that territory, and intellectual property rights and any other 
tangible or intangible, moveable or immovable, property and related property rights acquired or 
used for economic benefit or for other business purpose.39 On the contrary, an “investment” does 
not include a claim to money that arises solely from a commercial contract for the sale of goods 
or services (either by a national or by an enterprise in the Contracting Country to an enterprise in 
the other Contracting Country), the extension of credit in connection with a commercial 
                                                 
37  See Government of Canada, Prime Minister’s Office, “Canada-Nigeria Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement: News Release” (1 May 2013), online: Archived 
<www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/05/canada-nigeria-foreign-investment-promotion-protection-
agreement.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true>. 
38 See generally Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “Foreign Direct Investment Catalysts in West Africa: Interactions with 
Local Content Law and Industry-Community Agreements” (2012) 35 North Carolina Central L Rev 65-94. 
39 Ibid, art 1 (Definitions) FIPA. 
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transaction (such as trade financing), or any other claim to money that does not involve the kinds 
of investments described in the FIPA.40  
The Contracting Parties are required to treat investors from their countries and covered 
investments (i.e. National Treatment)41 no less favorably than it treats investors and investments 
from countries that are not parties to FIPA (i.e. Most-Favored Nation Treatment). 42  The 
Contracting Parties are further required to provide fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security of covered investments and investors of the other Contracting Country in 
accordance with the principles of international law.43 Additionally, the Contracting Country must 
provide non-discriminatory treatment, National Treatment, or Most-Favored Nation Treatment 
with respect to measures it adopts or maintains regarding compensation for losses incurred by 
investments in its territory as a result of armed conflict, civil strife, natural disaster, or similar 
cause.44 FIPAs prohibit a party from expropriating or nationalizing any covered investment in its 
territory, unless such expropriation or nationalization is (1) in the public interest; (2) in 
accordance with due process of law; (3) effected in a non-discriminatory manner; and (3) 
accompanied by payment of prompt and adequate compensation.45 The Canadian-Nigerian FIPA 
also prohibits limitations that require senior management to meet specific nationality 
characteristics (Senior Management). However, a Contracting Country may require that a 
majority of a board of directors, or any committee thereof, be comprised of members of a 
particular nationality or territory (provided the requirement does not materially impair the ability 
of the investor to exercise control over its investment).46 Each Contracting Country must grant 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, art 4. 
42 Ibid, art 5. 
43 Ibid, art 6. 
44 Ibid, art 7. 
45 Ibid, art 10. 
46 Ibid, art 8. 
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temporary entry to nationals employed by an investor of the other Contracting Country who 
seeks to render managerial or executive services to an investment in that territory, subject to its 
laws, regulations, and policies relating to the entry of aliens.47 The treaty also contains provisions 
on Corporate Social Responsibility and calls on investors to adopt internationally recognized 
standards and best practices on issues that include, but are not limited to, labor, the environment, 
human rights, community relations, and anti-corruption.48  
The Canadian-Nigerian FIPA has contains provisions on the settlement of disputes 
between an investor and the host party.49 Disputes may be submitted to arbitration for breach of a 
substantive obligation and for loss or damage as a result of the breach if consultations held to 
resolve the claim are unsuccessful. Generally, arbitrations are to be governed by the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, the Additional Facility Rules 
of ICSID, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Arbitration Rules, as determined under the terms of the FIPA. The ICSID regime provides more 
certainty with respect to enforcement of awards than other arbitration mechanisms because all 
ICSID contracting states, whether or not they are parties to the dispute, are required by the 
Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards. The Contracting Parties anticipate 
that the agreement shall remain in force for a period of 15 years.50  
While the efficacy of the FIPA between Canada and Nigeria remains untested by 
arbitration or otherwise, some observations emerge with regards to the potential nature of the 
agreement. Naturally, these observations are of an interim nature and would require further 
inquiry to understand the implication of the FIPA in the context of Canadian-Nigerian bilateral 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, art 16. 
49 See generally, ibid, ss C, D. 
50 See Government of Canada, Agreement Between Canada and Nigeria, supra note 34 art 43(3).  
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trade and investment. The first observation is that FIPAs and similar bilateral investment treaties 
by their nature have locking effects regarding possible economic flexibilities with respect to the 
concerned developing countries and regarding space or opportunities for citizens of the 
developing country/partner state to have their say in public policy choice. For instance, in the 
next section, I highlight the context of the privatization and deregulation of the Nigerian power 
sector reforms that has been driven primarily by Canadian consulting firms as a form of 
engagement between both countries. These need to be studied critically to understand the extent 
to which public policy choices have been constrained by the project.  
Second, the dispute settlement mechanism under FIPA – ICSID – has been criticized as 
unpredictable and open to bias.51 The ICSID regime provides more certainty with respect to 
enforcement of awards than other arbitration mechanisms because all ICSID contracting states, 
whether or not parties to the dispute, are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce 
ICSID arbitral awards. One of the major concerns is that, unlike judges of both domestic and 
international courts, arbitrators lack the safeguards that apply to judges. While it is 
understandable that foreign investors may lack confidence in the national judicial system of a 
developing country such as Nigeria, one cannot also overlook or underestimate the influence and 
power of large multinational corporations within such countries. It will therefore be interesting to 
study the extent to which the threat of actions against the Nigerian government, based on 
investments under FIPA by Canadian investors, have had any “chilling effect” on the Nigerian 
government’s decisions to raise regulatory standards or consider new policies in public interest.  
Third, the human rights ramifications or overlap of the FIPA requires a critical academic 
inquiry. It is worrisome that pertinent socio-economic issues, such as human rights and 
                                                 
51 Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World” (2007) 8 
San Diego Intl LJ 345. 
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environmental protection, were only considered under the Corporate Social Responsibility 
provision of the FIPA, despite the fact that both Contracting Parties are signatories to various 
human rights conventions. A major concern is that the protections guaranteed to investors under 
FIPA can conflict with or constrain states’ ability to meet its human rights obligations. This 
determination can however only be made conclusively in the context of Canadian-Nigerian 
engagements, by studying the effects of specific projects in Nigeria as the host country. In the 
next section, I briefly examine the involvement of some Canadian firms in Nigeria with a view to 
possibly raising future questions for scholarly investigations into the implications of these 
bilateral relations.  
 
IV. POWER SECTOR REFORMS: THE DOUBLE TALE OF PRIVATIZATION & 
ENERGY DISTRIBUTION IN NIGERIA 
 
The brief discussion of the privatization process is provided as a background for linking the 
involvement of Canadian consultancy firms in the process and, more importantly, to raise certain 
questions, that have remained unanswered in the literature, with respect to Canadian-Nigerian 
bilateral trade engagements. Historically, meeting the gap between the demand for power in 
Nigeria and the electricity available from the grid has been a challenge for the Nigerian 
government. Despite significant investment by the government over time, the power sector in 
Nigeria faces mixed challenges ranging from slow growth in generation capacity, market 
deregulation process interference by Government, electrical transmission lines and distribution 
equipment vandalism, poor maintenance of existing electrical facilities and corruption. Yet, the 
critical nature of this sector to the overall economic development of Nigeria means the 
government must continue to find the will and the means to optimize power generation. Against 
this troubled past, the decision to privatize the sector with the promise of efficiency and 
CANADIAN-NIGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 
  
optimization was widely embraced.  The National Electric Power Policy (2001) and the Electric 
Power Sector Reform Act, 200552 constitute the framework under which fundamental reforms to 
the power sector in Nigeria were enacted over a decade ago. These reforms included the 
dissolution of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the creation of the new Power 
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), and the unbundling of the PHCN into a series of 18 
successor companies – six power generation companies, 11 distribution companies and a 
national power transmission company. The privatization of the defunct PHCN’s successor 
companies, which commenced in December 2010, is now complete. The Federal Government of 
Nigeria (FGN), however, retained ownership of the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN).53  
In the implementation of the bilateral engagements between Canada and Nigeria, the 
power sector is one of the core industries in which Canadian firms have been significantly 
involved.54 Two Canadian firms – Manitoba Hydro55 and CPCS Transcom Limited56 – have 
played active roles in the privatization process of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
(PHCN), at the time Nigeria’s main electricity provider.  
Manitoba Hydro International, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Canadian electric and 
natural gas utilities company, managed TCN on behalf of the FGN. Following the completion of 
the privatization of the PHCN successor companies, the next phase of the privatization process 
was characterized by the sale of 10 government-owned independent power projects, called 
                                                 
52 See Electricity Power Sector Reform Act, 2005, online: 
<www.power.gov.ng/download/Electric%20Power%20Sector%20Reform%20Act%202005.pdf>. 
53 “Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) was incorporated in November 2005. TCN emerged from the defunct 
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) as a product of the merger of the Transmission and Operations sectors on 
April 1, 2004.” See Transmission Company of Nigeria, online: <www.tcnorg.com>. 
54 See generally Yemi Oke, “Manitoba Hydro and Electricity Undertakings in Developing Countries: The Case of 
Nigeria” (2012) 36:1 Man LJ 37.  
55 See Manitoba Hydro, online: <www.hydro.mb.ca>. 
56 See CPCS Transcom Limited, online: <www.cpcstrans.com/en/>. 
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National Integrated Power Projects (NIPPs), which commenced in 2013.57 In 2014, the sale of 
the NIPPs was concluded. The power sector, however, remains beleaguered by a series of 
challenges that are beyond the scope of this article.58 
On the one hand, the Canadian Pacific Consulting Services (CPCS) Transcom has been 
significantly involved in the power sector in Nigeria since the beginning of the privatization 
process of the country’s major electricity provider.59 According to CPCS, in their role as the 
transaction advisor to the Federal Government of Nigeria, they  
… carried out the due diligence review, develop[ed] detailed privatization plans for each 
of the successor companies, … advised on and assisted in implementing various reform 
measures to the electricity sector of Nigeria to support the new commercial framework 
for the sector, including the drafting of Power Purchase Agreements, Transmission 
Agreements and Performance Agreements to allow the government to monitor the long-
term performance of the private sector and ensure they maintain their investment 
commitments. CPCS was also responsible for administering the entire privatization 
transaction, including responding to thousands of investor inquiries, evaluating proposals 
received, leading the negotiations with preferred bidders, and assisting the government in 
completing the sale and handing over companies to the private investors.60 
 
From the above, it is clear that CPCS was not merely an advisor, but was also charged with the 
task of full-cycle completion of the successful privatization of Nigeria’s power sector. In other 
words, their involvement was not tangential. CPCS’ role in the reform of the power sector in 
Nigeria has come under close scrutiny. Despite the significant investment in international 
consultancy provided by the CPCS, the Nigerian electrical power sector remains in need of 
                                                 
57 See The Post, “FG Hopes to Raise $5 Billion Naira from sale of NIPPS” The Post (8 March 2014), online: 
<www.thepost-ng.com/fg-hopes-to-raise-5-billion-from-sale-of-nipps/>. 
58 See Adamu Abuh, “Why 10 NIPP Projects failed to generate 4, 541 mw, by BPE” The Guardian (8 December 
2016), online: <guardian.ng/news/why-10-nipp-projects-failed-to-generate-4541mw-by-bpe/>. 
59 See Table 1.1 of the CPCS Power-related consultancy provided at the Federal and State levels. For a detailed list 
and description of CPCS’ projects in Nigeria, see CPCS Transcom Ltd, Projects, online: 
<www.cpcstrans.com/en/projects/?country=Nigeria&service%5B%5D=>. These other projects include Public-
Private partnership trainings, port and rail concession advisory, among others. See also Geoffrey York, “CPCS 
Transcom helps tame traffic chaos in Lagos” The Globe and Mail (23 August 2012) The Globe and Mail 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/cpcs-transcom-helps-tame-traffic-chaos-in-lagos/article577897/>. 
60 See CPCS Transcom, Nigeria – Transaction Advisor for the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) Assets 
(10120), online: <www.cpcstrans.com/en/projects/nigeria-transaction-advisor-power-holding-company-nigeria-
phcn-assets-10120/>. 
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significant investment as its utility-scale electricity generation capacity continues to fall short of 
meeting domestic demands.  
On the other hand, Manitoba Hydro International Nigeria Limited, a subsidiary of 
Manitoba Hydro, has been involved in a series of projects in Nigeria as part of the privatization 
of the power sector. CPCS procured their services to “manage the Transmission Company of 
Nigeria (TCN), the only part of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria that was meant to 
remain government property.”61 These include the Management Contract for the Transmission 
Company of Nigeria, 62  National Electric Power Authority Training Program, 63  Utility 
Management Services for the National Electric Power Authority of Nigeria,64 Implementation of 
Pre-paid Metering System,65 and Technical Assessment – Hydroelectric Project for Tiga and 
Challawa Dams.66  During the power sector reforms, the Nigerian Bureau for Public Enterprises 
(BPE) transferred the management of the Transmission Company of Nigeria to Manitoba Hydro 
International Nigeria Limited under a management services contract. Tunji Ariyomo describes 
the inherent contradiction in Manitoba Hydro, itself a government entity, overseeing the 
privatization of the Nigerian counterpart. According to Tunji Ariyomo,  
[o]ne finds it a bit ironical that while Manitoba [Hydro International] remains solely a 
government owned company in Canada with a legislative protection to prevent its 
                                                 
61 Engler, supra note 4 at 193-194. 
62See Manitoba Hydro International, Management Contract for the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), 
online: <www.mhius.ca/projects/display,project/164/management-contract-for-the-transmission-company-of-
nigeria-%28tcn%29>. 
63  See Manitoba Hydro International, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) Training Program, online: 
<www.mhius.ca/projects/display,project/38/national-electric-power-authority-%28nepa%29-training-program>. 
64 See Manitoba Hydro International, Utility Management Services for the National Electric Power Authority of 
Nigeria, online: <www.mhius.ca/projects/display,project/137/utility-management-services-for-the-national-electric-
power-authority-of-nigeria>. 
65  See Manitoba Hydro International, Implementation of Pre-paid Metering Systems, online: 
<www.mhius.ca/projects/display,project/83/implementation-of-pre-paid-metering-systems>. 
66 See Manitoba Hydro International, Technical Assessment – Hydroelectric Project for Tiga and Challawa Dams, 
<www.mhius.ca/projects/display,project/84/technical-assessment-–hydroelectric-project-for-tiga-and-challawa-
dams>. A case study of these projects will provide important empirical basis for understanding the nature of the 
engagements between Nigeria and Canada and also for challenging theoretical assumptions about the nature of the 
relationship. 
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privatization, the company has announced that one of its key objectives is to reorganize 
Transmission Company of Nigeria such that its function as a Transmission Service 
Provider (TSP) could be separated and for the TSP to become a private commercial 
company.67 
 
While it is possible to argue that Manitoba Hydro is simply acting based on the terms of its 
engagement by the Nigerian government, it is important to situate the relations within the 
broader socio-economic and historical contexts of both countries.  
 The activities of Manitoba Hydro International came under closer scrutiny in 2016.68 The 
dispute that led to the intervention of the Nigerian Senate (the upper legislative assembly of that 
country) arose out of the refusal of Manitoba Hydro to accept payment in Nigerian currency. The 
motion adopted by the Nigerian upper legislative chamber69 complained that the management 
services contract prepared by the BPE:  
was fraught with apparent illegalities and total violation of laws of Nigeria … these 
apparent illegalities would inevitably result in corruption, inefficiency, waste of public 
resources, lack of transparency and accountability in the management of [the 
Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN)].70  
Based on this motion, a Senate Joint Committee on Power and Privatization was mandated to 
“investigate the entire circumstances surrounding the preparation, execution and implementation 
of management services for TCN and all other related matters.” 71  The double tale of their 
engagement in the privatization process presents a challenge to the image of Canada as moral 
and a good liberal, international citizen that is generally promoted by Canadian government 
                                                 
67 See Olatunji Ariyomo, “Power Sector Reform: TCN, Manitoba And Suggestions For The New Power Minister” 
Sahara Reporters (7 February 2013), online: <saharareporters.com/2013/02/07/power-sector-reform-tcn-manitoba-
and-suggestions-new-power-minister-tunji-ariyomo>. 
68 See Kristin Annable, “Hydro subsidiary raises Nigeria’s ire: Practices ‘unwholesome,’ African national accuses” 
Winnipeg Free Press (18 February 2016), online: <www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/hydro-subsidiary-raises-
nigerias-ire-369372331.html>. 
69 See Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Assembly, “Senate Passes Motions on Unwholesome Practices by 
Manitoba Hydro Limited & Demise of Olubadan” NASS (28 January 2016), online: <nass.gov.ng/news/item/199>. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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officials. These firms have been at the forefront of the promotion and entrenchment of neoliberal 
ideologies (requiring privatization, the divestment of government interests and control in the area 
of the provision of social services, and the promotion of public-private partnerships) as a viable 
solution in both the Nigerian and broader African contexts. Despite the privatization of the 
power sector in Nigeria, the sector remains marred by inefficiency and lack of optimization.72 
Both firms have been highlighted in recent times as examples of engaging Canadian-Nigerian 
bilateral relations. To understand the implications of their activities in Nigeria, however, more 
empirical research is required. From the limited research conducted to date, some implications 
can be drawn that provide the basis for future research. These are discussed below. 
 
V. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON CANADIAN-NIGERIAN BILATERAL 
RELATIONS AND QUERIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Two broad preliminary observations can be gleaned from this background study. The first is that 
the bilateral trade and investment relations between Canada and Nigeria may possibly be 
exaggerated. Despite the conclusion of FIPA over 3 years ago, it is yet to come into force. It is 
difficult to interpret the delay in entering into force of the FIPA. With respect then to the other 
statistics that account for significant trade flow between both countries, it would be interesting in 
the future to document the paradigm of such engagement with a view to explicating the socio-
economic benefits and implications. For example, to what extent have these trade relations 
created enhanced economic development in Nigeria? In the context of the power sector 
considered in the paper, it would be expedient to also pursue research that examines the 
problems that necessitated a legislative inquiry into the activities of the CPCS and Manitoba 
Hydro in Nigeria.   
                                                 
72  See PwC, Powering Nigeria for the Future (PwC, 2016), online: <www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-
centre/assets/pdf/powering-nigeria-future.pdf>. 
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Second, the engagement between Canada and Nigeria has the tendency to reinforce the 
structural imbalances in the international economic trading regime that is heavily skewed in 
broad favor of developed countries. The location of Canada and Nigeria in the Global North and 
Global South respectively, as well as the power imbalance between the two countries, means that 
it would be important to examine the extent to which, if any, these factors have impacted the 
bilateral relationship between both countries. As noted in this article, FIPAs by their nature favor 
investors more than the host state party. While the Canadian-Nigerian FIPA has yet to enter into 
force, the likelihood of a reproduction of the international imbalance that has historically posed a 
serious challenge for developing countries should not be underestimated. 
Clearly, this article has raised more questions than it answers. Although a general 
historical, thematic, and theoretical analysis of key aspects of Canada’s engagement with Nigeria 
has been undertaken, more empirical research (based on interviews and documentary search 
available for public viewing) is required in the future produce a more conclusive interpretive and 
legal analysis of Canadian-Nigerian engagements on the broad level. 
